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Quantifying Social Entities:
An Historical-Sociological Critique
JULIAN NEYLAN

School of History and Philosophy of Science
University of New South Wales, Australia
In formulating social policy the administrativearm of government relies
heavily on number-based significations of knowledge, such as needs indicators and performance measures. Relying on numbers increases administrators' confidence in their decisions and shifts responsibility for
error away from the decision-maker and towards the numbers. A close
examination of the technology of social quantification reveals instability
in many of the definitions and codes that needs analysts and program
evaluatorsadopt when numerically inscribingsocial entities. To deal with
these risks, bureaucraciesmust establish ways of explicitly assessing the
uncertainty,imprecision and social construction that often lies behind the
evidence presentedas numbers, evidence that can easily be accepted on face
value and be turned uncritically into decision-makingrationales.
Keywords: numbers, policy, social quantification, needs indicators,evidence, decision-making,statistics

The modem western state applies most public funds to its
social programs. The objectives of social programs are determined
by the social policy of the state, formulated ideally on sound
evidence. In recent years there has been a growing call for policy
to be evidence-based. The fundamental elements of this evidence
are meaningful descriptions of the characteristics of social entities that represent the needs of the citizens and the priorities
of the state concerning those needs, as determined through the
political process. Typically these social entities describe the population's health and welfare needs. For example, the state's health
administrators seek to know the population's priority needs in
health care and how these are likely to change, while regional
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and social planners seek forecasts of the socio-economic status of
sub-populations. This knowledge is invariably captured through
numbers, as quantitative significations of one or more social entities.1 As such it is numbers that are commonly used to signify the
social within the welfare policies of the modern western state.
The morphology of the social entity does not sit comfortably
with the concept of number. Numbers are ideally constructed
from systematic measurement processes that capture predictable
properties. Social entities generally are not of this character. As
the product of human behaviour, social entities are often unpredictable and possess little of the repeatable, systematic nature of a
physical entity such as distance or weight. They can be transient in
definition and variable in incidence. Even so, we find that the most
common way of signifying social entities is through numbers.
Why Bureaucrats are Attracted to Numbers
Administrative bureaucracies of the modern western state
fully embrace the technology of quantification to formulate and
implement their governments' welfare policies. Five distinct reasons for this are proposed.
(1) The inevitable avalanche of numbers that arisesfrom government
action
The state has evolved with a reliance on a series of technical
apparatus that enable governments to govern. These techniques
are exercised by the administrative bureaucracy as agent of government. In the exegesis of the 'grand narrative' of the history
of modern society, historians and sociologists have developed a
range of themes to explain the nature and purpose of administrative bureaucracies, such as Weber's iron cage (1992), Latour's
centres of calculation (1987) and Foucault's art of governmentality
(1991). A defining role of the bureaucracy is the practice of surveillance. This generates large banks of official statistics about the
state and its citizens which, along with other technical apparatus
of governmentality, facilitate the purpose of systematisation and
control of the state (Dandeker 1990, Dean 1994, Giddens 1990).
Foucault describes the rise of statistics, or knowledge of the
state, as a key apparatus of the expanding state in post-Renaissance
Europe. Statistics made it possible to quantify masses of population
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characteristics with which to plan, manage and control. This avalanche of numbers also enabled patterns to be identified which
revealed the population's: 'own regularities, its own rate of deaths
and diseases, its cycles of scarcity, etc' (Foucault 1991:99). One
outcome of these central surveillance activities was that governments' administrative control became inseparable from its routine
monitoring of official statistics (Giddens 1990:42). Today this is
facilitated by a network of bureaucratic specialists who, armed
with the latest computer technology, engage in quantification, calculation and codification to assist the development of social policies. Hunt & Wickham point out that these enumeration activities
'generate social policies that operate both to constitute the 'social
problems' at which government action is directed and actively to
regulate, control and coordinate the targets thus created' (1994:53).
Hence government action and the language of quantification have
become inextricably linked.
(2) The growing call for policy to be evidence-based
An important element of the push for social entities to be signified through number is the institutional trend towards social policy and practice that is evidence-based (Stoker 1999). This is underpinned by a prevailing view that 'good policy' is founded on
empirical evidence constituted within a rational model of policy
formulation. This in turn presumes that policy is formed through
a cycle of investigative, analytical and consultative activities that
systematically injects 'evidence' at pre-determined stages in the
cycle (Keynes, 1971). This view takes a positivist approach to what
constitutes evidence, preferring the numerical outputs of research
such as statistical data, over non-numerical knowledge such as
values, intuition and practical know-how (Brownson Baker Leet
& Gillespie 2003, Leicester 1999). Hence, institutional action in
support of policy formulation is commonly geared to the production of the bureaucracy's preferred form of evidence, i.e. numbers.
Studies of policy-making in action reveal significant and regular variations to the Keynesian ideal. For example, Doherty (2001)
cites the case of social housing policy in the United Kingdom
and identifies a paradox in the evidence-policy nexus where, despite a strong research program, research evidence rarely impacts
directly on housing policy formulation2 . Critics of the rationalist
approach argue that policy-making practice usually falls short of
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this idealised model. Alternative approaches recognise the role of
power, culture and language in shaping the direction of policy setting. For example a Foulcauldian alternative would frame the key
drivers in terms of power and knowledge (Gibson 2003:27). Other
alternatives include 'disjointed incrementalism' (Braybrooke &
Lindblom 1963) and 'mixed scanning' (Etzioni 1967). They all
emphasise the incomplete nature of what the rational model
assumes to be a valid relationship between positivist evidence
and policy formulation.
(3) The bureaucrat'sneed for impersonalityof decision-making
In systems of modern state governance the bureaucracy is
expected to have a sense of neutrality and objectivity and a commitment to the agency's purpose (Jaensch 1991:278-9). This is
consistent with the Weberian-derived model, in that politics decides the strategic goals and priorities of the state as dictated by
the will of the people, and the bureaucracy merely computes the
means in an impartial and apolitical fashion. Bureaucrats' greatest
vulnerability is the public perception they have acted partially.
This ensures that neutrality is generally among their foremost
motivations. Bureaucratic communications that feature numbers
and the language of quantification are more likely to convey neutrality than other significations, such as the vernacular language.
This is partly because discourses that rely on quantification are
characterised by a high degree of structure, in that their users
have an assumed knowledge of the rules or codes of conduct for
their use. This enables the language of numbers to remove an appearance of imprecision and value-ladeness from administrative
action and replace it with one of objectivity and disinterestedness.
These characteristics are regarded as advantageous for honest
government and the fair allocation of resources. But as Porter
contends, quantification can also be: 'a way of making decisions
without seeming to decide' (1995:8). Because the bureaucracy is
not elected and has no democratic legitimacy, any decision that
can be made 'by the numbers' will have the necessary appearance
of impartiality.
Governing by numbers, at least in certain western economies, has
become the dominant managerial rationale... . according.objectivity, neutrality, and legitimacy to decisions that otherwise appear to
be subjective. (Miller 1994:250)
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(4) The power of the 'single figure' and the role of standardisation
To be most effective the instruments of government control
and systematisation need to be spatially portable. In this regard
quantitative measures have a natural advantage over qualitative
measures. This, plus the success with which signifying social
entities through number has been accepted, allows the language
of quantification to dominate technical discourses on social measurement. For the modern bureaucracy to exert control over social
actions, such as the processes and decisions involved in administering a social welfare program, the actions must be standardised.
This is dependent on the associated social entities being stable.
The success of social mathematics is largely due to the success
with which researchers and bureaucrats have stabilised concepts
of social entities and developed methods for measuring them. Examples are poverty, need and well-being, entities that are transient
in nature, difficult to categorise and therefore unsuited to being
quantified. By turning them into forms that are easily signified
and collected, social action can be stabilised for the purpose of
counting, packaging and distribution throughout the state. Standardisation is a key technique in this process, enabling the bureaucracy to produce summary single figures that bring an appearance
of stability and objectivity to highly subjective social entities.
The neutrality and social authority accorded to the single figure
is one that is set above the fray, apart from disputes and political
interests, and endowed with a legitimacy that seems difficult to
contest or dispute (Miller 1994:246)
However the inherent lack of stability of social entities means
that the elemental codes for their standardisation are always subject to revision. This is the paradox of standardisation. For numerical inscriptions to remain stable the agents of quantification must
agree on what conventions to adopt. Because these agreements
rely inherently on negotiation there is always a risk of dissent
from one or more agents. Therefore the quest to standardise social
entities is never closed.
(5) The pre-conditioningof bureaucratsas agents of calculation
Calculative technologies rely on two related constructs. One
is the calculator's willing participation as compliant and selfinterested user of the language and techniques of enumeration.
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The other is the bureaucratic facility to support and enable the
calculator to calculate. Each relies on the language of numbers
and utilises the tools of calculation, such as algebraic methods
and computers. As Rose observes: 'turning the objects of government into numericised inscriptions.., enables a machinery
of government to operate from centres that calculate' (1991:676).
The success of quantification in measuring the social is therefore
a product of the ability of researchers, policy analysts and administrators to link-up as a calculative network3 . A key feature of this
network is that those who count and that which is counted are
equally subjected to the process of codification and standardisation. Not only does the network act to package and distribute
social numbers, it also perpetuates a culture that regards numbers
as essential for formulating policy. In this way numbers enable
the boundary between politics and objectivity to be redrawn: 'by
purporting to act as automatic technical mechanisms for making
judgments, prioritising problems and allocating scarce resources'
(Rose 1991:674). Surrounded by this calculative culture, bureaucrats are conditioned agents of calculation.
The Thing About Numbers
The construction and use of quantification in social policymaking occurs within the context of a broad culture of quantification present in everyday life. This culture arises from our psychosocio propensity to approach the objects of existence, the matter
and ideas of everyday life, in terms of quantities. In our private
lives we have a propensity to quantify all manner of everyday
activities (Cohen 1968). In our public lives we expect and depend
on a world that runs on numbers-from distances, to timetables,
to consumer decisions, to financial transactions.
In many everyday settings the generation and use of numbers
is uncontroversial. This is particularly so with numbers that describe physical entities. For example, how many different types of
letters are on this page? Provided we agree on what a letter is and
we can see and count, then little else is problematic; a number is
an accurate and efficient device for signifying this physical entity.
But what of the use of numbers to signify social entities? These
have more transient cultural definitions than physical entities.
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Examples include the health of the environment, the success of
social services, the relative value of consumer choices, and the
quality of life. When the same quantification process that so successfully signifies a non-social entity is transferred with little critique to a social entity, problems of false objectification can arise.
The use of numbers in everyday settings has been theorised
from several perspectives. Crosby (1997) identifies this culture as
a new model of reality that emerged in Europe during the late
Middle Ages and Renaissance to replace the ancient qualitative
model. It was aided by visualisation and, in particular, by mapmaking. This enabled space to be conceptualised in geometric
terms. By linking visualisation with quantification, reality could
be rendered measurable. Potter, Wetherell and Chitty (1991) use
discourse theory to analyse ordinary dialogues that rely on numbers. They highlight how the logic and devices of quantification,
such as percentages, tables and charts, are marshalled in persuasive ways to support an argument, and conclude that mathematics and other forms of quantification operate only as part of
broader social practices from which they gain their sense. Lave
(1986) observes the extent to which the language and rationality
of quantification has penetrated everyday culture. She examines
the situational specificity of calculation and measurement procedures through ethnographic research in ordinary settings, such as
the supermarket, and observes how people customise numerical
devices for use in their everyday settings for the purpose of
persuasive argument or to assist in their decision-making.
Underlying each of these analyses is the particular appeal that
the exactness of number as sign holds for its users, compared
to other ways of signifying knowledge, such as qualitative descriptions. Qualitative descriptions, particularly when expressed
through the vernacular language, have more potential for misinterpretation or conveying unintended meanings. This could
be due, for example, to one party's lack of prior knowledge of
concepts, events or cultural norms otherwise presumed to be
known. This subjectivity of word as sign sits in contrast to the
apparent objectivity of number as sign. For the number 5 (say) is
always the number 5, cannot be mistaken as the number 4 or 6,
or any other number. As such, it is discrete, exact and universal
in its ability to be understood with a singular meaning.
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How Good are Social Numbers?
A critical analysis of the actions, processes and motives of the
calculative enterprise that is typically applied to the quantification of social entities, reveals a range of measurement problems
that challenge the rigour of the resulting numbers. The following
two examples of the calculative enterprise demonstrate some of
these problems. These concern the state population census and
the measurement of housing need.
Example 1: The state population census
Governments' reliance on social statistics for policy-making
is founded on an assumption that officially-sanctioned statistical
surveys, such as the national census, produce reliable results. For
example, the Australian Bureau of Statistics claims that: 'high
quality data are obtained from the census' (ABS 1996:19). The
state census survey is generally of higher statistical reliability than
other datasets held by governments. This is due to their investment of intensive survey and data processing infrastructure to
limit the margin for technical error. However on close analysis of
this diverse calculative enterprise a series of reliability questions
arises.
Like all bureaucratically-administered statistical collections,
the state census contains two broad types of error: technical and
non-technical error. The technical integrity of census counts cannot be achieved in isolation of their non-technical integrity. While
the latter is rarely acknowledged, the final census counts are only
accurate to the extent that the census-taking agency deals accountably with both types of error. Examples of non-technical error are
the extent to which the counts rely on qualitative judgments, the
different interests of the participants in these judgments, how
specific meanings are assigned to census data items to enable
quantification and how these are re-interpreted over time.
Before conducting any social survey the statistician must design and construct the appropriate data categories. While this
may seem an uncontroversial technical responsibility, historical
sociologists argue that its effects are far-reaching:
There is a sense in which many of the facts presented by the bureaucracies did not even exist ahead of time. Categories had to be
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invented into which people should conveniently fall in order to be
counted. (Hacking 1990:3)
The transient nature of category labeling and category meanings is exemplified when measuring social behaviours that are
governed by cultural norms. For example, McGuire refers to
imperialist data surveys in early twentieth century India and the
colonial administration's measurement of workforce participation on the basis of discrete occupational categories borrowed
from the United Kingdom. These categories assumed a stage
of economic development incommensurate with the reality of
Indian society at that time. Rather, a working Indian's livelihood
was commonly gained in many different ways over a year, especially in the agricultural populations of central and southern
India. The publication Census of India 1921 comments that 'the
occupational statistics collected in the population schedule give
at best only a general sketch of the functional distribution of
people and are too vague and imperfect to afford the detailed
information required for public and administrative purposes'
(McGuire 1992: 14). That is, the theoretical underpinnings of the
colonialists' data categories ignored the norms of the society they
were enumerating:
...the ideological parameters are established by the statistical categories employed in the classificatory system devised by the Colonial
state to collect data.. . . these categories do not necessarily mirror
the social reality they are endeavouring to describe.... when employed as a conceptual instrument to collect data they can distort
that reality. (McGuire 1992:13-4)
The history of census category definitions reveals much about
the interests and power relations of the counter and the counted,
and of the systemic influences of the counting process itself4 .Compounding this is the transient nature of the culture that shapes
the social behaviours of the population to be enumerated. Tait
investigates the socio-political nature of the label 'family' in the
history of the Australian census. He identifies ambiguities in the
different meanings that have been attached, which at different
times have been defined as a group of related persons living
together, a respectable centre of reproduction and a network of
persons connected through blood ties. That is, they have ranged
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from cohabitation to fertility to kinship. As well, the orderly inheritance of property required an official system for recording births,
deaths and marriages which: 'provided evidence of legitimacy
and therefore rights of succession' (Tait 1985:95). In these ways
government-sponsored statistical collections can assist in legitimising power and confirming status among favoured population
groups.
If the intention of the census is to capture the size and diversity
of the state's social characteristics, its ability to depict that character is constrained by the need to be highly selective in the number
and type of questions it asks. What questions are asked, how
they are asked and what answers are permissible, are open to the
interests of any advocacy group that can successfully negotiate
its case, including the government of the day, as exemplified in
Australia:
The 1981 census will be different from 1976 not because the government of Malcolm Fraser has a different view of Australia from that
of the Whitlam Labor government. It does not see the census as a
vehicle for social change, as did Labour. (Hywood 1981:37)
The 1981 census reduced the number of questions asked
from 53 questions in 1976 to 35. The questions eliminated included one's need for child-minding facilities, one's racial origins,
whether one has life assurance or pays into a superannuation fund
and whether one receives some form of statutory income or benefits. With the political transition at that time from an Australian
government emphasising larger government and an expanded
social welfare program (Whitlam-led) to one emphasising small
government and encouragement of market-based responses to
social and economic needs (Fraser-led), the political overtones of
these census topics is clear'.
The political arm of other modern states display similar interestedness. For example, during planning for USA's 2000 census,
Republican members of congress objected to how the Bureau of
the Census was using statistical sampling methods to correct its
upcoming survey of the population (Keiner 1997:12). Members
feared that the resulting corrections would give higher counts
of Hispanics and blacks, favouring the Democrats when congressional district boundaries were redrawn. One Republican
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congressman advised his constituents not to complete the questionnaire, stating that the 2000 USA census was: 'another onerous
sign of the Federal government expanding without regard to personal freedom' (Alcorn 2001:28). In 2002 the government of Russia
conducted its first national population census for 13 years. In the
lead up, opinion polls showed that a quarter of the population
was wary about the government's motives, fearing it would be
used by the tax authorities or the police for ulterior motives. This
was fuelled by past leaders' manipulation of census counts:
Residents of the remote eastern Siberian town of Belogorsk offered
to co-operate if the Government switched the electricity back on, but
they fear that it will be disconnected after the count. (Paton Walsh
2002:20)
In summary, a strong element of social control has accompanied the technical apparatus of population measurement in the
evolution of the modern state. A census survey of population
characteristics is far from a technical enterprise concerned with
disinterested social measurement. It reflects the interests of advocacy groups, the expertise of the administrative bureaucracy
and the priorities of political utility. As Alterman concludes: 'the
reason for the failure of a Census to be completely inclusive lies
in the fact that it is a social enterprise' (Alterman 1969:65). One
consequence is that the planning and funding decisions of government and business that are made on the basis of census counts,
may be distorted by an exclusive, subjective and utilitarian profile
of the state's population.
Example 2: Measuring housing need
Housing assistance programs in the modern state operate in a
context of scarcity that is generally not mediated through market
surpluses. This requires judgments based on non-market criteria
about the size of program resources and their fair allocation.
The problem of scarcity creates an environment of uncertainty
for program administrators. They must make difficult decisions
about who should be assisted, in what priority order and with
what housing products or services. In this respect their greatest
vulnerability is the risk of decisions that lead to an ineffective,
inequitable or wasteful use of public resources, or that lead to
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accusations of bias or incompetence. To manage these pressures,
administrators are attracted to number-based significations of
housing need, or needs indicators. These are commonly quantified by applying technical processes according to tightly specified
normative criteria. The normative criteria for measuring housing
need are a series of pre-determined social, economic and demographic factors considered to be critical for housing well-being.
For example:
rental affordability for low-income households is based on the second quintile household income (fortieth percentile) calculated each
quarter from total (full and part-time) average weekly earnings for
NSW. Paying up to 30% of income in rent is considered affordable.
This amount is compared with rents in each area to determine the
proportion of available housing which a low-income household can
afford to rent. (DOH 1999:31)
Once specified, the normative criteria are applied to data collections that describe the circumstances of individual households.
In this way the number of households that fit the .category 'in
housing need' can be determined. While this approach holds
in theory there is much debate and difference among housing
researchers and policy practitioners about which combination
of normative criteria, and the attendant thresholds for each of
these criterion, are the most suitable for conducting large-scale
needs analysis (King 1994, Nicol 2002). The Australian Institute
of Health and Welfare cautions:
while estimates of numbers of families in housing need provide important information when debating policy on housing assistance, it
should be realised that there are many different ways in which these
estimates can be derived.... the housing problems to be included
in an analysis, and how they are defined can affect greatly the results
that are obtained. (AIHW 1998:26)
For example, a 1997 study of housing need by the National
Centre for Social and Economic Modelling demonstrated how the
number of income units measured as 'in housing stress' changed
significantly according to the chosen normative criteria. The figure rose from 167,000 using a 'net equivalent affordability measure' to 225,000 using a 'net affordability measure' to 300,400
using a 'gross measure' (NATSEM 1997:12).
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Apart from the difficulties of choosing a set of needs characteristics that reflect normative housing conditions, there are
a series of more fundamental enumeration decisions of a nontechnical nature that bear just as heavily on the size of the final
needs numbers. The most fundamental of these is what counting
unit should represent 'housing need'. This cannot be decided on
technical grounds, rather on socio-political grounds such as:
" what choice of counting unit will support what government
priority? or
" what aspect of the program should the needs measure reflect?
To measure housing need there are three possible counting units.
Each has meaning, each is logical and each is measurable, yet each
gives very different counts:
1. the types of assistance required (e.g. number of dwellings or
amount of grant funds)
2. the recipients of assistance (e.g. number of persons assisted)
3. the assistance activities (e.g. number of lettings).
Having chosen one of these, there are more non-technical problems to resolve. If for example the second option is chosen (number in need of assistance) a choice is required between whether
to count people assisted, income units assisted, families assisted
or households assisted. Many housing assistance programs differ
on this basis, such as Australia's private rent assistance program
(counts demand by number of income units) and social rental
housing program (counts demand by number of households).
Because people can be multiple to income units, which can be
multiple to families, which can be multiple to households, the
choice of counting unit has a multiplier effect on the count.
This exemplifies a fundamental limitation of housing needs
measurement, as follows: 'meeting housing need' presumes that a
unit of supply will house a unit of demand, however the nature of
housing supply and housing demand are a conceptual mismatch.
The unit of demand is characterised by people who live alone or
combine with other people in family or household arrangements.
These arrangements are not static since people move from one
living arrangement to another, giving a profile of demand that
is constantly dynamic. This dynamism is generally greater for
people in housing need. The unit of supply is just as variable. It
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may be conceptualised as a physical dwelling structure, as some
part of that structure (eg. boarders occupying part of a private
dwelling) or as a form of tenure, such as a lease, ownership
or short-term commercial room hire. These different demand
units may be combined with the different supply units in many
ways, most of which are quantifiable. However each combination
describes a different aspect of the concept 'housing need' and each
yields a different count. Choosing which combination to measure
cannot be decided on technical grounds.
In summary, defining housing need for the purpose of quantifying it begins with an uncertain process of subjective decisions
about methodology, such as what counting unit should be used
and which aspects of need should be included. These uncertainties prevent the construction of a stable, reliable standard for
defining and measuring need. In spite of these limitations the
technical agents of the bureaucracy engage in elaborate processes
of analysis and enumeration on the basis of these non-technical
and often arbitrary decisions. The result is a series of needs indicators that seek to capture the nature of both housing need and allocative priority. These numbers are attractive to the bureaucracy
because they appear to reconcile the myriad of non-technical
questions that arise when deciding how to ration scarce public
funds. They also appear to introduce accuracy and objectivity
into these decisions. As such a significant degree of authority is
conferred on these numbers. This is exemplary of Miller's general
identification of the neutrality and social authority associated
with the 'single figure' (1994:246).
Demystifying the Certainty Image
The difficulty of legitimating quantitative measures of social
entities supports the argument that social numbers be treated
as highly-qualified significations. They are a consequence of the
technical as well as non-technical factors necessarily involved
throughout the quantification process, from defining the component measures, to collecting the data for each component and generating the final numbers. They come, therefore, with conditions
attached, of which some are explicit and some are not. Though
single figures provide the look of certainty, as all numbers do, they
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may mislead the policy development process or falsely indicate
the success or failure of social performance. Their uninformed
use as persuasive instruments of decision-making reinforces the
standardisation practices of the calculative network that produces
them and may also mask an ulterior purpose. As Porter (1995)
observes, in quests for objectivity quantification becomes most
important where elites are weak, private negotiation is suspect
and trust is lacking.
This is not the case in all settings. Many social researchers and
bureaucrats are careful to avoid these pitfalls of interpretation
and inference, based on what they know of the non-technical
errors and qualitative assumptions of their data or on what they
have taken the trouble to investigate. Often the problem lies
downstream, where a politician or journalist may knowingly
or carelessly pervert the meaning or context of the researcher's
carefully documented single figures.
Regardless of these risks, governments' social programs must
rely on the measurement of social entities. Indicators of social
need must be constructed and the performance of welfare programs needs to be evaluated if responsible and accountable government is to proceed. Social measures that are signified asnumbers will not necessarily help in these endeavours. While the best
quantitative methods may yield accurate information in some
policy or program aspects, they will not yield this in other aspects.
In either case the degree of accuracy or inaccuracy may itself be
immeasurable. Rather, social measurements yielding information
regarded as accurate will be known as such because the stakeholders will agree that useful 'facts' have been produced. In this
search for social facts, analysts and administrators should not
assume that numbers are necessarily their ally. They are rarely
neutral, are poor substitutes for facts if used without care and
can be as inherently unstable as non-numeric ways of signifying
knowledge.
To deal with these risks, bureaucracies must establish ways of
explicitly assessing the social construction embedded in positivist
forms of evidence. Efforts to improve the presentation and use of
social numbers would be informed by a broad-ranging debate on
the fundamental question: how do we conduct a discourse about
quality using the language of quantity?
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Were social numbers presented with accompanying statements that listed their known and unknown limitations, much of
this concern would dissipate through the forces of self-regulation,
ie peer review and scrutiny. Of course such a development would
require a significant cultural shift in the sociology of quantitative
measurement. But assuming it came to pass, the scenario emerges
of bureaucrats and politicians armed with the requisite social
numbers and their explicit qualifications, along with other forms
of evidence. The final piece in the jigsaw is a set of transparent processes to enable this information to instruct social policy
decision-making. One element of this set is proper processes of
participatory public consultation. Another element is a risk management framework that encourages decision-makers to exercise
their professional judgment by applying their expertise, powers
of reasoning and discernment to all of the available evidence,
empirical and non-empirical. As Fisher contends: 'the concept of
'expertise' in risk regulation should not be understood narrowly
as simply referring to... someone only skilled in applying a
certain methodology to the facts. .. [rather] ... it refers to professional judgment ... [which] ... requires intuition, creativity,
and a sensitive grasp of the issues' (Fisher 2000:116).
Having institutional processes in place that can evaluate these
'facts' and then establish a rationale for subjective judgments,
would not lessen the credibility of the judgments. Nor would
it necessarily produce less accurate judgments than occurs in
the current climate, where an artificial authority is conferred on
many social numbers and other empirical evidence. If nothing
else it would infuse more credibility into these decisions through
improved accountability. This can only heighten the public trust
placed in the political and administrative arms of government.
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Notes
1. The state census of population is a common source of these numbers.
2. Doherty offers two explanations for this: 'the changing nature of housing
policy and its increasing complexity as it is implicated in a multitude of social,
economic and political problems beyond the mere provision of shelter;...
[and] ... the filtering role played by political ideology in determining the
relationship between evidence and the shaping of policy agendas' (2001:168).
3. Miller calls these concepts calculative selves and calculative spaces. Calculative selves refers to the distinctive social way in which the language
and processes of calculation, such as financial accounting, bear upon the
actions of others, installing forms of individualised calculability into the
workplace. Calculative spaces are created through the compartmentalisation
of structures into divisions of bureaucratic accountability, such as cost centres
and business units (Miller 1994:243).
4. Maier observes that a society: 'chooses what to measure-or better stated,
groups within society struggle about what will be measured' (1995:238).
5. In 1976 there was a change of national government in Australia with a
Liberal/National coalition government lead by Malcolm Fraser replacing the
Labor government lead by Gough Whitlam.

